The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recently ruled on the case of Anthony D. Grafton, a Yeoman Petty Officer Third Class in the United States Navy, who was convicted of sexual assault. The court's decision, issued on September 17, 2026, affects Grafton’s conviction and the subsequent sentencing. This ruling is significant as it clarifies legal standards regarding consent in sexual assault cases within the military.
The case arose from an incident on September 5, 2022, when Grafton was accused of sexually assaulting a fellow sailor, identified as VL. The trial found Grafton guilty of two specifications of sexual assault under Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, eight years of confinement, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. However, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) later set aside one of the specifications and reinstated the other, affirming the sentence. Grafton then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
The dispute centers around the military judge's instructions during the trial and whether the CCA had the authority to reassess Grafton's sentence after reinstating one of the specifications. Grafton's defense argued that the military judge's instructions regarding consent were flawed and that the CCA improperly reassessed the sentence without proper authority.
In its ruling, the court affirmed the CCA's finding that the military judge's instructions complied with existing case law, specifically referencing the case of United States v. Mendoza. However, the court also concluded that the CCA exceeded its authority by imposing a sentence for Specification 2, which had not been previously sentenced by the trial members. The court stated, "The CCA lacked the authority to sentence Appellant on a newly reinstated specification for which no sentence had previously been imposed by the members." Consequently, the court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on Specification 2.
The background of the case reveals that Grafton was accused of assaulting VL while she was incapacitated due to alcohol consumption. Testimony during the trial indicated that VL was unable to consent at the time of the alleged assault. The military judge provided instructions to the members of the panel regarding the elements of consent and the definitions of sexual assault under the UCMJ.
During the appellate review, the CCA found that the military judge had erred in her instructions but determined that the error was harmless because the specifications were charged in the alternative. The CCA reinstated Grafton's conviction for Specification 2, which alleged that he had engaged in sexual conduct with VL while she was incapable of consenting due to intoxication. The CCA affirmed the existing sentence, reasoning that the maximum punishment for both specifications was the same.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces disagreed with the CCA's approach to sentencing. The court emphasized that the members of the trial panel had not imposed a sentence for Specification 2, which meant that the CCA could not simply apply the existing sentence from Specification 1 to Specification 2. The court stated, "If there is no longer a conviction, there is no longer a sentence," highlighting the need for a proper sentencing hearing.
The ruling has implications for future cases involving sexual assault in the military, particularly regarding how consent is defined and how charges can be structured. The court's decision reinforces the importance of ensuring that a defendant is properly informed of the charges against them and that they have the opportunity to defend themselves against each specification.
Moving forward, the case will be sent back to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for a new sentencing hearing on Specification 2. This means that Grafton will have the chance to present his case again regarding the specific charges against him. The outcome of this new hearing could potentially alter the terms of his punishment.
Details were not available in the court filing regarding whether Grafton plans to appeal the new sentencing hearing or if there are related cases pending. However, the ruling sets a precedent for how military courts handle similar cases in the future, especially concerning the nuances of consent and the structure of charges in sexual assault cases.











