In a significant ruling, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the retrial of DeJuan Lamar Kelley, who was convicted of reckless homicide after his first trial ended in a mistrial. The court's decision, issued on June 23, 2026, addressed Kelley's claims of procedural double jeopardy and questioned the trial court's sentencing discretion. This case, filed under docket number 25A-CR-01454, has implications for defendants facing retrials in similar circumstances.
The case began with a tragic incident on June 7, 2020, when Kelley, then 20, encountered his ex-girlfriend Emeriee Bryant at a gas station in Bloomington, Indiana. During a confrontation, Kelley brandished a handgun and fired shots, one of which struck Michael Parker, a passenger in a vehicle, resulting in Parker's death. Kelley was initially charged with murder, attempted murder, and carrying a handgun without a license.
After a jury was sworn in for Kelley's first trial in February 2024, the proceedings were halted when defense counsel made statements during opening arguments that the trial court deemed improper. The court had previously issued a motion in limine to prevent character evidence regarding the State's witnesses, including Bryant's friend, Taleah Vaught. Defense counsel's comments about Vaught's criminal background led the State to request a mistrial, which the court granted, citing the necessity of a fair trial.
Kelley subsequently argued that the mistrial was not justified and that retrying him would violate his rights under the double jeopardy clause, which protects individuals from being tried for the same offense after a mistrial. However, the trial court found that the mistrial was necessary due to the defense's actions, which directly caused the need for a mistrial.
In March 2025, Kelley faced a second trial, where the jury acquitted him of murder and attempted murder but found him guilty of reckless homicide and carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court sentenced Kelley to a total of six years in prison. Kelley appealed, challenging both the retrial and the sentencing.
The court ruled that Kelley's retrial did not constitute procedural double jeopardy. Chief Judge Tavitas, who authored the opinion, stated, "The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial at the beginning of Kelley’s first jury trial." The court emphasized that the mistrial was entirely attributable to the defense's violation of the court's order, and that the trial court adequately considered alternatives to declaring a mistrial.
Furthermore, the court noted that the burden imposed by the mistrial was minimized because it occurred shortly after the jury was sworn in, before any evidence was presented. This factor weighed heavily in favor of the trial court's decision to grant the mistrial.
As for Kelley's sentencing claims, the court found them moot since he had already served his sentence. The trial court had sentenced him to 2,184 days, and by the time of the appeal, Kelley had completed his sentence.
The ruling has broader implications for future cases involving mistrials and retrials. It clarifies the conditions under which a mistrial may be declared and reinforces the principle that defendants cannot claim double jeopardy if the mistrial was justified by a manifest necessity. This case serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in criminal trials and the legal protections afforded to defendants.
Looking ahead, Kelley has limited options for appeal since the court's ruling on his sentencing is moot. However, the case may set a precedent for how similar cases are handled in Indiana courts, particularly regarding the application of double jeopardy and the discretion of trial courts in granting mistrials.