The California Court of Appeal recently ruled on a significant case involving a probate dispute between Andrew P. McKinley and Erin B. Harris, the trustee of the McKinley Family Living Trust. The court denied Harris's request for attorney fees after McKinley dismissed his petition against her. This ruling affects trust beneficiaries and sets important precedents regarding the awarding of attorney fees in probate cases.
In the case, McKinley, a beneficiary of the trust, filed a petition against Harris, alleging she was mismanaging trust assets, including two hotels. After McKinley dismissed his petition, Harris sought to recover attorney fees incurred while defending herself in the case. The court's decision clarifies the limits of a probate court's authority to award attorney fees, particularly when a trustee is sued in their individual capacity.
Andrew P. McKinley is a beneficiary of the McKinley Family Living Trust, which was established by Harris's late parents in 2010. The trust includes assets such as two hotels located in San Clemente, California. McKinley claimed that Harris and her co-trustee, Scott Harris, were delaying the administration of the trust and taking actions that were not in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
In May 2024, McKinley filed a verified petition under California Probate Code section 850, naming Harris and Scott as trustees and Harris in her individual capacity. He accused them of mismanaging the trust and requested the transfer of his one-third interest in the hotels. Following a series of legal maneuvers, including the withdrawal of lis pendens, McKinley ultimately dismissed his petition in October 2024.
After the dismissal, Harris filed two motions for attorney fees: one as a trustee and another in her individual capacity. The probate court denied both requests, stating it lacked the authority to award attorney fees without statutory or contractual authorization. Harris appealed the denial of her individual fee motion, arguing that the probate court had broad equitable powers to award fees.
The court ruled that the probate court's authority is limited and that it cannot award attorney fees to a trustee who incurs them solely for their personal defense. The ruling emphasized that the general rule in California is that each party bears its own attorney fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. The court stated, "California follows the American Rule which holds that attorney fees incurred in litigation are not recoverable unless authorized by statute or contract."
The court found that Harris did not provide any legal basis for her claim that the probate court could award her attorney fees in her individual capacity. The ruling clarified that while probate courts have equitable powers, these powers do not extend to awarding attorney fees incurred for personal defense. The court cited previous cases to support its conclusion, noting that the authority to award fees typically arises from actions that benefit the trust, not the individual trustee.
The impact of this ruling is significant for beneficiaries and trustees involved in probate disputes. It reinforces the notion that attorney fees are not automatically recoverable in probate cases and that trustees cannot seek reimbursement for personal legal expenses incurred in their individual capacities. This decision may deter frivolous claims against trustees, as it establishes a clear boundary regarding the recovery of attorney fees.
Moving forward, this ruling may influence how beneficiaries approach litigation against trustees. It underscores the need for beneficiaries to carefully consider the grounds for their claims and the potential financial implications of pursuing legal action. Additionally, trustees may need to be more cautious in their actions to avoid personal liability for attorney fees.
As for the future of this case, Harris has the option to appeal the ruling further, although the court did not indicate any specific grounds for such an appeal. There are no related cases pending that were mentioned in the court filing. The ruling stands as a clear interpretation of the limits of equitable powers in probate matters.









