The Connecticut Supreme Court recently issued a dissenting opinion regarding the burden of proof in insurance claims related to underinsured motorist benefits. The dissent, authored by Justice McDonald and joined by Justice Zarella, addresses the responsibilities of insured individuals when seeking to toll the statute of limitations on their claims. This ruling may significantly affect how similar cases are handled in the future.
The case in question, Romprey v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (docket number SC18858), revolves around the claims made by Dolly and Peter Romprey against their insurer, Safeco. The Rompreys argued that their claim for underinsured motorist benefits should not be barred by the three-year limitation period set in their insurance policy. They contended that they had provided sufficient notice to Safeco about their claim before the expiration of the statute of limitations, thereby tolling the time limit.
The Rompreys' dispute with Safeco arose after an automobile accident that occurred on November 16, 2004. They initiated their claim for underinsured motorist benefits after the three-year period had expired, which led Safeco to file for summary judgment, asserting that the Rompreys' claim was time-barred. The trial court ruled in favor of Safeco, concluding that the Rompreys had failed to demonstrate that they met the requirements for tolling the statute of limitations under General Statutes § 38a-336 (g) (1).
In the dissent, Justice McDonald emphasized that the burden of proving tolling falls on the insured when they assert it as a defense against a summary judgment motion. He argued that once Safeco proved that the Rompreys did not file their claim within the prescribed three-year period, the burden shifted to the Rompreys to show that they had met the tolling requirements. McDonald stated, "the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing an issue of material fact as to whether they had satisfied the requirements for tolling that period under § 38a-336 (g) (1)."
The court's ruling highlighted the importance of understanding the tolling provision within the context of the statute. Justice McDonald pointed out that the statute allows for tolling only if the insured notifies the insurer of a potential claim in writing before the expiration of the limitation period and commences an action or demands arbitration within 180 days after exhausting the tortfeasor's coverage.
Justice McDonald further explained that the legislative history of § 38a-336 (g) (1) supports the conclusion that the insured bears the burden of proving tolling. He noted that the statute was enacted to address previous court decisions that allowed insurers to impose shorter limitation periods. The dissent argues that the statute's language indicates that the insured must take affirmative steps to satisfy the tolling requirements.
The impact of this dissent could be significant for future cases involving underinsured motorist claims in Connecticut. By clarifying the burden of proof for tolling, the court's opinion may influence how similar disputes are litigated. Insured individuals may now need to be more diligent in providing timely notifications and evidence to support their claims for tolling, as failure to do so could result in their claims being dismissed.
Moving forward, this dissent may set a precedent for how courts interpret the burden of proof in insurance claims related to tolling. Insured individuals will need to be aware of their responsibilities under the law and ensure they adhere to the requirements set forth in the statute.
As for what’s next, it remains to be seen whether the Rompreys will seek to appeal the ruling or if there are related cases pending that could further clarify the issues surrounding tolling in underinsured motorist claims. The court filing did not provide additional details on any potential appeals or related cases.