A U.S. District Court has ruled against a request for alternative service by plaintiffs suing the Islamic Republic of Iran and its military. This decision affects individuals seeking justice for alleged terrorism-related acts. The case highlights the challenges faced by victims when attempting to serve foreign entities under U.S. law.
The case, titled Dehnoushi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, was filed on June 22, 2026, under Civil Action No. 2025-2109. The plaintiffs, led by Stella Dehnoushi, sought to hold Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) accountable under the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). This law allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign governments for acts of terrorism.
The dispute centers on how the plaintiffs can properly serve legal documents to the Iranian entities. The plaintiffs initially asked the court to allow service via email, arguing that the IRGC and MOIS should be classified as agencies of the Iranian state. However, the court previously ruled that these entities are considered the foreign state itself, which requires a different service process.
In their renewed motion for alternative service, the plaintiffs argued that they were unable to effect service through traditional means, as Iran does not participate in international conventions for service and has refused to accept certified mail. They also noted that the ongoing armed conflict in the region has made it impossible to serve documents through the Swiss Embassy, which has been used in other cases against Iranian entities.
Judge Randolph D. Moss presided over the case and issued the ruling. He stated, "Nothing in Plaintiffs’ latest motion supports a different result." He emphasized that the court is bound by previous decisions from the D.C. Circuit Court, which classify the IRGC and MOIS as governmental entities. Therefore, service must adhere to the requirements set out in Section 1608(a) of the FSIA.
The court's opinion reiterated the distinction between governmental entities and agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state. Judge Moss noted, "if the core functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered the foreign state itself; if commercial, the entity is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state." The plaintiffs did not contest that the IRGC and MOIS perform governmental functions.
Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for alternative service without prejudice, meaning they can renew their request if they present new arguments or evidence. Judge Moss acknowledged the plaintiffs' good faith efforts to serve the defendants but stated that the court cannot alter the classification of the IRGC and MOIS based on their inability to serve them under the prescribed methods.
This ruling has significant implications for victims of terrorism seeking justice against foreign states. It underscores the difficulties in navigating the legal system when dealing with entities that are classified as foreign states under U.S. law. Victims may find it challenging to hold foreign governments accountable for their actions, especially when traditional methods of service are not viable.
The court's decision also highlights the importance of adhering to established legal precedents. The plaintiffs may now need to explore other avenues for service, such as waiting for the Swiss Embassy to reopen or finding additional legal arguments to support their claims.
Looking ahead, the plaintiffs have the option to appeal the court's decision or to renew their motion for alternative service if they can provide further justification for their request. The outcome of this case could set a precedent for how similar cases involving foreign states and terrorism are handled in the future.
Details were not available in the court filing regarding any related cases or potential appeals. However, the challenges faced by the plaintiffs in this case reflect broader issues within the legal framework governing foreign sovereign immunity and the complexities of international law.