A New York Supreme Court judge has denied a habeas corpus petition filed by Jamiek Goodwin, who is currently detained at the Rose M. Singer Enhanced Supervised Housing Facility on Rikers Island. The ruling, made by Judge Ellen Biben on April 28, 2026, comes after Goodwin argued that his detention was unlawful due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
The case, indexed as 153275/2026, centers on Goodwin's claim that a 38-day period should not have been excluded from the speedy trial time limits set by law. He contended that if this period were included, the prosecution would have exceeded the 90-day limit for felony cases, which would necessitate his release. This decision is significant as it touches on the rights of individuals facing felony charges and the obligations of the prosecution to adhere to statutory time limits.
Goodwin filed the petition through Andrew Haste, who represents him in this matter. The New York County District Attorney's Office, represented by ADA Meaghan Dunigan, opposed the petition. The case reached the Supreme Court after Goodwin's initial motion for release was denied by Judge Melissa Lewis in a lower court. Goodwin's legal team argued that Judge Lewis incorrectly interpreted the law regarding the exclusion of time periods in determining the readiness of the prosecution for trial.
The dispute arose from a 38-day adjournment between December 5, 2025, and January 12, 2026, which Judge Lewis deemed excludable under the precedent set in the case of People v. Green. Goodwin's team argued that this ruling was erroneous, as they believed the prosecution should not have been granted additional time to prepare for hearings that were not directly related to the trial.
In her ruling, Judge Biben affirmed the lower court's decision, stating, "The excludability of this period exists independently of the People's discovery obligations and their readiness status." She noted that the law allows for reasonable periods of delay for the prosecution to prepare for trial after a court decision on pretrial motions. The court emphasized that the People could not be expected to predict the outcome of a court's decision regarding defense motions.
Judge Biben's opinion also highlighted the significance of the 90-day time limit imposed by CPL § 30.30(2)(a), which requires the prosecution to be ready for trial within that timeframe. However, she concluded that the adjournment period in question was reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Lewis.
The court's decision has implications for similar cases involving speedy trial rights and the interpretation of excludable time periods. By affirming Judge Lewis's ruling, the court reinforced the principle that the prosecution is entitled to a reasonable amount of time to prepare for trial, even in the context of pretrial motions. This could set a precedent for future cases where defendants challenge the excludability of time periods related to their trials.
Moving forward, the ruling means that Goodwin will remain in custody unless further legal action is taken. The decision may also influence how other defendants in similar situations approach their own habeas corpus petitions and motions for release based on speedy trial violations.
Goodwin's legal team may seek to appeal this decision, but details regarding the next steps were not available in the court filing. The outcome of this case could have broader implications for the rights of individuals detained in similar circumstances and the responsibilities of the prosecution in ensuring timely trials.