The Indiana Supreme Court ruled on November 4, 2026, that a lower court's decision regarding vicarious liability in a motor vehicle accident involving a Tesla employee was incorrect. The case, Kyle Kaszuba v. Annamarie Dugan Norris, as Guardian of the Estate of Christopher Dugan, an incompetent person, centers on whether Tesla is liable for the actions of its employee, Kyle Kaszuba, during a commute. The ruling is significant as it addresses the scope of employment and employer liability in the context of employee commuting.

The case began when Kaszuba, a service assistant for Tesla, was involved in a collision with Christopher Dugan while driving a Tesla service truck. Dugan suffered severe injuries, leading to a lawsuit against both Kaszuba and Tesla. The question at the heart of the dispute was whether Kaszuba was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, which would make Tesla vicariously liable for his actions.

Background

Kyle Kaszuba was employed by Tesla and had permission to drive a company service truck. On April 25, 2017, he was commuting to work when he decided to stop for gas. During this stop, he collided with Dugan, who was riding his motorcycle. Dugan's injuries were serious, prompting his mother, Annamarie Dugan Norris, to file a lawsuit against both Kaszuba and Tesla, claiming that Kaszuba was acting within the scope of his employment during the accident.

The trial court initially ruled in favor of Norris and Kaszuba, finding Tesla vicariously liable for Kaszuba's actions. However, Tesla contested this ruling, arguing that Kaszuba was merely commuting and not performing any work-related duties at the time of the accident. This led to an appeal, where the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision regarding vicarious liability but reversed the damages awarded, citing procedural errors during the trial.

The Ruling

The Indiana Supreme Court, led by Justice Slaughter, ultimately reversed the trial court's summary judgment that favored Norris and Kaszuba. The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Kaszuba was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Justice Slaughter stated, "We hold that the evidence designated below presents a material factual dispute over whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment." The court emphasized that the determination of whether Kaszuba was acting within the scope of his employment should be made by a jury, not through summary judgment.

The court's opinion highlighted the complexities surrounding the going-and-coming rule, which typically states that employees commuting to and from work are not acting within the scope of their employment. However, exceptions exist, particularly if the employee is performing a task for the employer or is under the employer's control. The court noted that the facts surrounding Kaszuba's commute and his decision to stop for gas were disputed, warranting a trial to resolve these factual issues.

Impact

This ruling has significant implications for employer liability in Indiana. It clarifies that the determination of whether an employee's actions fall within the scope of employment is often a factual question for the jury. The court's decision reinforces the principle that employers may be held liable for their employees' actions if those actions are found to be within the scope of their employment, even during commutes. This case may set a precedent for future disputes regarding vicarious liability and the going-and-coming rule, particularly in situations where employees use company vehicles.

Additionally, the ruling emphasizes the importance of clear policies regarding employee use of company vehicles and the circumstances under which employees are considered to be acting within the scope of their employment. Employers may need to review and clarify their policies to avoid potential liability in similar cases.

What's Next

The case has been remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether Kaszuba was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. This means that a jury will now assess the facts surrounding the incident and decide on the issue of vicarious liability. The outcome of this trial could further clarify employer responsibilities in similar situations.