The Court of Appeals of Georgia recently ruled on a significant asbestos case involving Georgia Power Company and Kevin R. Sinyard. The court upheld a lower court's decision that dismissed two defendants from the case and stated that Georgia Power could not have a jury apportion fault among other potential tortfeasors. This ruling impacts how cases involving asbestos exposure are handled in Georgia, particularly regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and the apportionment of fault.

Kevin Sinyard, a former pipefitter, was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma in 2014. He and his wife filed a lawsuit in 2016 against several defendants, including Georgia Power, Ford Motor Company, and Union Carbide Corporation. They alleged that Sinyard's illness was caused by exposure to asbestos while working at various job sites, including those owned by Georgia Power. After several legal proceedings and settlements with some defendants, Georgia Power remained the sole defendant in the case.

The case has been through multiple appeals, with the Court of Appeals ruling on it three times. The most recent decision, dated November 3, 2026, addressed Georgia Power's appeal against the trial court's order that dismissed Ford and Union Carbide from the case. The trial court also ruled that Georgia Power could not apportion fault among these dismissed parties, which Georgia Power argued would adversely affect its rights under Georgia law.

The court's ruling is based on the interpretation of Georgia's apportionment laws. Under OCGA § 51-12-33(b), a defendant can only have fault apportioned if multiple defendants remain in the case at trial. Since Ford and Union Carbide were dismissed, Georgia Power could not claim apportionment of fault. The court affirmed this interpretation, stating, "Where—all defendants except one have been dismissed before trial, then the trier of fact will not apportion fault under OCGA § 51-12-33(b)." This decision clarifies the conditions under which fault can be apportioned in personal injury cases involving multiple defendants.

In addition to the issue of fault apportionment, the court also addressed Georgia Power's challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony. Georgia Power sought to exclude the testimony of the Sinyards' expert witnesses, including Dr. Jerrold Abraham, who provided causation opinions regarding Sinyard's exposure to asbestos. The trial court had previously denied Georgia Power's motions to exclude this testimony, concluding that it was based on reliable data and methodologies.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, emphasizing the broad discretion that trial courts have in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. The court stated, "The trial court did not abuse its 'broad discretion' in denying the motion to exclude DePasquale's opinion evidence." This ruling reinforces the importance of expert testimony in asbestos cases, where establishing causation is critical to a plaintiff's success.

The implications of this ruling are significant for future asbestos cases in Georgia. By affirming the trial court's decisions on both fault apportionment and the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has set a precedent that could influence how similar cases are litigated. Plaintiffs may face challenges in proving causation if they cannot present reliable expert testimony, and defendants may find it more difficult to apportion fault if they are the only remaining party in a case.

As for the next steps, Georgia Power may consider appealing the ruling to the Georgia Supreme Court. However, the court filing did not specify whether an appeal would be pursued. Meanwhile, the Sinyards' claims against Georgia Power remain active, and the outcome of this case could have lasting effects on asbestos litigation in the state.