The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a lower court's decision that five voters, known as the Plaintiff Voters, are considered "prevailing parties" in their legal battle against the Lehigh County Board of Elections. This ruling, filed on October 29, 2026, addresses the issue of attorney fees under federal law and clarifies the criteria for determining prevailing party status in election-related cases.
The case, Linda Migliori v. Lehigh County Board of Elections (Docket No. 22-1499), stems from a dispute over the treatment of mail-in ballots in Pennsylvania. The ruling is significant because it impacts how attorney fees are awarded in civil rights cases and sets a precedent for future election-related litigation.
The Plaintiff Voters, consisting of Linda Migliori, Francis J. Fox, Richard E. Richards, Kenneth Ringer, and Sergio Rivas, argued that their ballots were improperly discarded due to a lack of date on the envelope, which they claimed violated their voting rights. They initially filed their lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the Board's actions violated federal law. The District Court ruled in their favor, establishing them as prevailing parties and awarding them attorney fees, albeit at a reduced amount.
The Lehigh County Board of Elections appealed this decision, challenging the District Court's conclusion that the Plaintiff Voters were indeed prevailing parties. The Board argued that the District Court had made errors in determining the reasonableness of the awarded attorney fees and in defining the relevant market for attorney rates.
In its ruling, the Third Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating, "We exercise plenary review over legal issues relating to the appropriate standard under which to evaluate an application for attorney’s fees, including whether Plaintiff Voters are a prevailing party." The court agreed with the District Court's assessment that the Plaintiff Voters had achieved a favorable outcome and thus qualified for the designation of prevailing parties.
However, the court also addressed the Board's concerns regarding the reduction of attorney fees. The Plaintiff Voters had contested the Board's objections to their fee request, claiming the objections were not specific enough. The Third Circuit ruled that the Board's objections were indeed sufficiently specific, allowing the District Court to exercise its discretion in reducing the fee award based on its own assessment of the case's demands and the work performed.
The court noted, "The determination of the appropriate billing rate is a factual finding which we review for clear error." The District Court had determined that the relevant market for attorney fees was Allentown, Pennsylvania, rather than the broader Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which influenced the fee reduction. The Third Circuit found no clear error in this determination.
Additionally, the court upheld the District Court's decision to deny the Plaintiff Voters' request for attorney fees related to litigating the fee petition itself. The court stated that while prevailing parties can sometimes be awarded fees for such litigation, the Plaintiff Voters had not provided the necessary analysis to support their request.
The ruling has implications for future cases involving election law and civil rights. By affirming the Plaintiff Voters' status as prevailing parties, the court reinforces the ability of individuals to seek legal recourse when they believe their voting rights have been violated. This decision could encourage more voters to challenge election-related disputes, knowing that they may be entitled to recover attorney fees if they prevail.
Looking ahead, the Board of Elections may consider further legal options, including potential appeals or related cases that could arise from this ruling. The Third Circuit's decision serves as a reminder of the importance of protecting voting rights and ensuring fair treatment of ballots in elections.
